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Abstract
Does law itself evolve? It has been widely suggested that culturally transmitted behavioral
information exhibits a Darwinian evolutionary dynamic. The argument is straightforward. Dar-
winian evolution has three basic elements: (i) replicative descent with (ii) variation, subject to
(iii) a form of selection. Bundles of cultural information as diverse as language, religious prac-
tices, and how to bake bread pass with imperfect ﬁdelity from generation to generation. Some of
the variants created by these imperfections are passed, non-randomly, to the next generation with
greater frequency.1
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Does law it self evolve?  It has been widely suggested that culturally transmitted 
behavioral information exhibits a Darwinian evolutionary dynamic.
1  The argument is 
straightforward.  Darwinian evolution has three basic elements: (i) replicative descent 
with (ii) var iation, subject to (iii) a form of selection.
2  Bundles of cultural information as 
diverse as language, religious practices, and how to bake bread pass with imperfect 
fidelity from generation to generation.  Some of the variants created by these 
imperfections are passed, non -randomly, to the next generation with greater frequency.  
1 See, e.g., ROBERT  AUNGER  (ED.), D ARWINIZING  CULTURE  : T HE  STATUS OF  MEMETICS AS   
SCIENCE  (2001); SUSAN  BLACKMORE, T HE  MEME  MACHINE (1999);  R. B OYD AND   PETER RICHERSON, 
CULTURE AND THE  EVOLUTIONARY  PROCESS (1985);  L.L. C AVALLI-SFORZA AND  M. F ELDMAN, C ULTURAL 
TRANSMISSION AND  EVOLUTION: A Q UANTITATIVE  APPROACH (1981);  RICHARD  DAWKINS, T HE  SELFISH 
GENE (2
nd edition) (1989 Original edition published 1976)); Daniel C. Dennett,  The Evolution of Culture: 
The Charles Simonyi Lecture , Oxford University, Feb 17, 1999, at 
http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/dennett/dennett_p1.html; William H . Durham,  Advances in Evolutionary 
Culture Theory , 19  ANNUAL  REVIEW OF  ANTHROPOLOGY 197 (1990); M.R. Flinn,  Culture and the 
Evolution of Social Learning , 18  EVOLUTION AND  HUMAN  BEHAVIOR 23 -67 (1997); Liane Gabora,  The 
Origin and Evolution of Culture and Cr eativity, 1  J. M EMETICS, 1 (1997) at 
http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/vol1/gabora_l.html; Oliver R. Goodenough and Richard Dawkins, 
The St. Jude Mind Virus , 371  NATURE 23 -24 (1994); Oliver R. Goodenough,  Mind Viruses: Culture, 
Evolution and the Puzzle of  Altruism. 34  SOCIAL  SCIENCE  INFORMATION 287 -320 (1995); Ward H. 
Goodenough,  Outline of a Framework for a Theory of Cultural Evolution  33  CROSS-CULTURAL  RESEARCH
84 (1999).
2 ROBERT  WRIGHT, T HE  MORAL  ANIMAL (1994) 23 -26.  See generally,  CHARLES  DARWIN, T HE
ORIGIN OF  SPECIES (1859) (the first of a number of editions, many of which are variously reprinted).2
Dawkins suggested the term “meme” for such cultural elements
3, and a cluster of sub -
disciplines applying evolutionary theory to human culture has come into being.
4  One 
flavor  - focusing on the evolution of the culture elements  - is sometimes called 
“memetics.”
5  Another major strand, perhaps a bit more “holistic” in approach, and often 
more rigorously presented, is called by some “gene -culture co -evolution.”
6
But what about law ?  A growing  - if still limited  - number of authors have applied 
these kinds of approaches to legal systems.
7   As E. Donald Elliott reminds us in his 
important 1985 survey  The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence ,
8 the history of using 
evolutionary thi nking in the study of law is remarkably long.   A great deal of that 
tradition has been at the level of metaphor.  Some, however, attempted to use “formal 
3 Dawkins,  supra note 1.
4 See generally , Flinn,  supra note 1;  K.N. L ALAND AND  G.R. B ROWN, S ENSE AND  NONSENSE. 
EVOLUTIONARY  PERSPECTIVES ON  HUMAN  BEHAVIOUR, (Forthcoming, 2002).
5  Blackmore,  supra note 1.   See generally , the journal  MEMETICS,  available at 
http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/.
6  Laland and Brown,  supra note 4.
7 See, e.g. , Donald E. Elliott, et. al.,  Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolut ion: The Federalization 
of Environmental Law , 1  J. L. E CON. & O RG. 313 (1985); Michael Fried,  The Evolution of Legal Concepts: 
The Memetic Perspective , 39  JURIMETRICS 291 (1999); Thomas E. Geu,  Chaos, Complexity, and 
Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management  Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium , 65 
TENN. L. R EV. 925 (1998); J.B. Ruhl,  Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law -and-
Society System: A Wake -Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State , 45  DUKE 
L.J. 8 49 (1996); J.B. Ruhl,  The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law 
and Society and its Practical Meaning for Democracy , 49  VANDERBILT  L. R EV. 1407 (1996); Jeffrey E. 
Stake,  Are We Buyers or Hosts?  A Memetic Approach to the  First Amendment , 52  ALA. L. R EV. 1213 
(2001); Michael S. Fried,  The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective , 39  JURIMETRICS  J.
291 (1991); J.M. Balkin,  Ideology as Cultural Software , 16  CARDOZO  L. R EV. 1221 (1995); Sam Vermont, 
Politics and Li terature: New Perspective: Memes and the Evolution of Intellectual Dishonesty in Law , 22 
LEGAL  STUD. F ORUM 655 (1998); Neal A. Gordon,  The Implications of Memetics for the Cultural Defense , 
50  DUKE  L. J.  1809 (2001).
8  E. Donald Elliott,  The Evolutionary  Tradition in Jurisprudence , 85 COLUM. L. R EV. 38 (1985); 
see, also,    E. Donald Elliott,  Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?   41  ST. L OUIS  L.J. 595 (1997); E. 
Donald Elliott,  The Tragi -Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and Environment al 
Law, 20  VA. E NVTL. L.J.  17 (2001)3
theories of law based on self conscious analogies to evolutionary theory in biology.”
9
One of the mo st noted proponents in the United States tradition is Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.  Evolutionary thinking is a strong theme in  THE COMMON  LAW,
10 and an 
explicit one in  Law in Science and Science in Law.
11  Unfortunately, Holmes’ work, like 
much of the early ev olutionary thinking about society, shared in the flaws of Social 
Darwinism which helped lead to an eclipse of such approaches.
12
The revival in the latter decades of the 20
th Century of applying evolutionary 
analysis to cultural artifacts has reinvigorate d its use in the law.  Some have continued at 
the level of metaphor,
13 others have made explicit claims based in memetics,
14 and still 
others have drawn on complexity theory as well as evolution.
15
Many of the more general discussions of cultural evolution,  and some of its 
specific applications to the law, have focused on the “downstream” consequences of this 
9  Elliott (1985),  supra note 8.  
10 OLIVER  WENDELL  HOLMES, J R., T HE  COMMON  LAW  (1881) (Variously reprinted. Available on 
line at http://biotech.law.umkc.edu/Books/Holmes/claw_c.htm).
11 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,  Law in Science and Science in Law , 12  HARV. L. R EV. 443 (1899). 
12 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, Superintendent , 274 U.S. 200 (1927).  For a nuanced reappraisal of 
Holmes’ thought and the role of evolution in it,  see ALBERT  W. A LSCHULER, L AW  WITHOUT  VALUES: T HE
LIFE, W ORK,  AND  LEGACY OF  JUSTICE  HOLMES (2000).  See, generally, Oliver R. Goodenough,  Biology, 
Behavior and the Criminal Law: Seeking a Responsible Approach to an Inevitable Interchange , 22 
VERMONT  L. R EV. 263 (1997).
13  E.g., William H. Rodgers, Jr.,  Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas’ 
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers and Effective Law,  65  U. C OLO. L. R EV. 25 (1993)
14 Stake,  supra note 7, Vermont,  supra note 7, Fried,  supra  note 7, O.R. Goodenough (1995), 
supra note 1.
15 J.B. Ruhl (1996 bo th references)  supra note 7; J.B. Ruhl,  Thinking of Mediation As a Complex 
Adaptive System , 1997  B.Y.U. L. R EV. 777; J.B. Ruhl,  The Co -Evolution of Sustainable Development and 
Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict , 9  DUKE  ENV. L. & P OL’Y  F. 161 
(1999); J.B. Ruhl,  The Coevolution of Administrative Law with Everything Else , 28  FLA. S T. U.L. R EV. 1 
(2000); J.B. Ruhl,  Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the 
Environment By Making a Mess of Env ironmental Law , 34  HOUS. L. R EV. 933  (1997); Geu,  supra note 7. 4
approach  - what could we expect an evolutionary system of culture to produce in the way 
of specific memes and behaviors?
16  But, as the DNA revolution t aught us, in order to get 
the downstream end right, it is critical to identify the specific dynamics of the “upstream” 
replicative process itself.  Furthermore, the study of cultural evolution has been slowed 
by a  tendency to fall back on explicitly biolo gical proximate models.  Recent studies 
have recognized the need both for a more general approach to evolutionary phenomena, 
of which cultural and biological processes can be seen as specific cases, as well as for 
better, sui generis descriptions of the pr oximate mechanisms through which cultural 
elements replicate, vary, and have differential replicative success.
17  A better description 
of the proximate mechanisms of cultural transmission will provide a clearer 
understanding of cultural evolution, and of ev olutionary approaches to the law itself.
  One account of cultural evolution argues that human imitative processes  -
understood broadly  - create the possibility of cultural transmission and therefore provide 
the starting point for this kind of a detailed  picture of culture.
18  I have previously 
suggested that cultural transmission occurs through the imitation of remembered actions, 
rather than of ideas, a process that leads to a significant bottleneck in what can be passed 
on culturally.
19   This approach f urther classifies the transmission of actions into three 
modes  – nonlinguistic transmission, stories, and formulas, a development that helps to 
circumvent the bottleneck.  If correct, such a dynamic will have implications for the kinds 
of information that  a cultural process such as the law can transmit.  This paper will 
16 I have been as guilty of this as anyone.  See, e.g., O.R. Goodenough (1995)  supra note 1.
17 E.g., Blackmore,  supra note 1; Gabora,  supra note 1; Laland & Brown,  supra note 1.
18 E.g.,O. R . Goodenough (1995),  supra note 1.
19 Oliver R. Goodenough,  Information Replication in Culture, Three Modes for the Transmission 
of Culture Elements Through Observed Action,  in  PROCEEDINGS OF THE  AISB 1999 S YMPOSIUM ON 
IMITATION IN  ANIMALS AND  ARTIFACTS 9 -11 (1999); Oliver R. Goodenough,  Information Replication in 
Culture: Three Modes for the Transmission of Culture Elements through Observed Action , in  K. 
DAUTENHAHN AND  C. L. N EHANIV, (E DS.), IMITATION IN  ANIMALS AND  ARTIFACTS (MIT Press, 
forthcoming, 2002) .  Significant portions of this essay are adapted from these two treatments.5
describe my suggested approach in some detail.  It will then turn more briefly to the law, 
sketching examples of the explanatory power  - and limits  - of my approach.
Replication in Culture  Rests on the Imitation of Action
“Ideas” as such do not replicate  - there is no direct brain to brain link that allows 
the transmission of the internalized information structure.  Computers, of course, with the 
proper interconnection, can transfer data  directly to each other.  Even my son’s relatively 
simple Game Boy came with a cable that could connect it directly to others, allowing, 
during the fad, for a machine -to-machine trade of the more exotic Pokemon characters.  
Humans have no such inter -cranial pipe.  What we do observe, and can recreate, is  action.  
An idea must become an action if it is to spread.  Reflecting this necessity, Gatherer has 
suggested that the entire “thought contagion” metaphor should be abandoned for cultural 
evolution.
20
Of co urse, storage through mental modeling of the action in the brain of a human 
is also a critical link in the replicative chain.  In this sense, the brain is part of the medium 
of copying, and this mental modeling, while not the focus of the model discussed i n this 
paper, is an object of lively study in its own right.
21  Furthermore, the presence of this 
modeling in our cognition can both effect our thinking more generally and lead to other 
actions, actions that can be non -replicative.  Action -to-action imitati ve replication is not 
the sole realm of human cognitive functioning, nor is it the sole realm of learning.  
Nonetheless, cultural replication –  the core of the memetic claim  –  occurs when an 
20 Derek Gatherer,  Why the Thought Contagion Metaphor is Retarding the Progress of Memetics , 
2 J. M EMETICS 135 (1998) at http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom -emit/1998/vol2/gatherer_d.html.
21 See, e.g. , Aaron Lynch,  Units, Events and Dynamics in Memetic Evolution , 2   J.  M EMETICS
(1998), available at  http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/1998/vol2/lynch_a.html; K. Richards on, 
Hyperstructure in Brain and Cognition , 10  PSYCOLOQUY (1999), available at 
http://www.cogsci.soton.ac.uk/cgi/phyc/newpsi?10.031.6
action (or in some cases, a result from which the action can be  inferred
22) is repeated by 
an observer and observed and repeated by others in their turn.  Those aspects of culture 
that follow an evolutionary dynamic will necessarily reflect this pattern.  The importance 
of action in the transmission of culture has been  recognized by writers as diverse in time 
and subject matter as Jane Ellen Harrison
23 and Marvin Harris.
24
Role of Language in Avoiding a Bottleneck
In what looks like an “idea” transfer, actions can be linguistic  – i.e. the repetition 
of a word formula.   As will be more fully discussed below, these linguistic actions can, as 
stories or formulas, carry imbedded behavioral and cognitive messages piggy -backed, as 
it were, on the linguistic action itself.  But while a secondary meaning can be created 
through  language, and modeled in its turn if properly “decompressed” in the observer’s 
mind, the thing replicated from one person to the next is the linguistic action, and not the 
meaning itself.  Indeed, the linguistic action can be learned and relearned by rote,  perhaps 
as a matter of ritual, by a chain of people ignorant of the language in which it is phrased.
As a boy living for a year on a small, traditional island in Micronesia, where most 
of the residents did not speak any English, I was on the receiving e nd of just such a chain.  
Shortly after my arrival several children approached me and rhythmically chanted “Gary 
Cooper is an actor.”  The coded content of this short sentence meant literally nothing to 
the speakers, but they knew it was English, and they  wanted to make me feel welcome.
This action to action step in the transmission process creates a very narrow 
22 A. Whiten and R. Ham,  On the Nature and Evolution of Imitation in the Animal Kingdom: A 
Reappraisal of a Century of Resea rch, in 21  ADVANCES IN THE  STUDY OF  BEHAVIOR, (1992).
23 JANE  ELLEN  HARRISON, P ROLEGOMENA TO THE  STUDY OF  RELIGION (1903, reprinted 1991).7
doorway through which human culture must pass, a true bottleneck.  This kind of 
bottleneck has been described in the context of language
25.  It wi ll also constrain other 
aspects of cultural transmission.  In the absence of some way to encode or compress 
information, what can be passed on culturally will be limited to action/context 
combinations  actually observed  in a context of direct experience, im posing significant 
limitations on both the quantity and the type of information that can be passed.  Human 
language, together with two important modes of its use, have provided powerful tools for 
the coding, compression and preservation of behavioral infor mation that would be 
difficult or impossible to transmit by non -linguistic means.
Three Modes 
Action based transmission of cultural information between humans can be 
usefully classified into three general modes: non -linguistic (uncoded), sto ries (partially 
coded), and formulas (fully coded).  Other modes are certainly theoretically possible, and 
may well exist in practice, but these modes appear widely encompassing for human 
behavior as it exists.  The approach suggested provides explanations  for such legally 
relevant  phenomena as hypocrisy and the separation of law and morals, but it has not yet 
been tested in a systematic way.
Non-linguistic/Uncoded Transmission.
Non-linguistic, uncoded transmission depends upon the direct observation th at 
forms the bottleneck described above.  In its simplest form, an action by person A in a 
particular context is observed by person B.  The action and the context for it are stored in 
the brain of B, waiting for the context to reoccur for B.  When this con textual trigger 
happens, the behavior is reproduced, and, if observed by C, the context and behavior are 
stored again.  
While the behavior rests in the brain in a modeled, or symbolized, form, and can 
be abstracted and generalized by the brain in connec tion with various thought processes, 
it is uncoded in the sense that the context/action pattern does not depend on language or 
24 MARVIN  HARRIS, T HEORIES OF  CULTURE IN  POSTMODERN  TIMES (1998).
25 See, e.g. , S. Kirby,  Learning, Bottlenecks and I nfinity: A Working Model of the Evolution of 
Syntactic Communication , In  PROCEEDINGS OF THE  AISB’99 S YMPOSIUM ON  IMITATION IN  ANIMALS AND 
ARTIFACTS. T HE  SOCIETY FOR THE  ARTIFICIAL  INTELLIGENCE AND  SIMULATION OF  BEHAVIOR (1999).8
some other form of coding to aid in its modeling or transmission.  In this it is somewhat 
analogous to phenotypic transmission, s omething observed in traditional biology in RNA 
replication
26.
Language is not used directly in this mode, although it may be used secondarily to 
initiate a teaching session, to register approval and disapproval, and to make help make 
corrections.  Notwit hstanding the usefulness of language for facilitation, this mode of 
transmission exists without it.  Indeed, this kind of simple imitative process, which can be 
assumed to be developmentally “programmed” in humans, could be how language 
comprehension gets  constructed in the developing brain, at least in the early stages.
Stories/Partly Coded Transmission
Once language enters the human repertoire, it can be used to tell a story.  Of 
course  this is only one of the many possible uses of language, but one t hat can be 
recruited into the process of cultural transmission. When the linguistic message is 
understood in the brain, the action/context mix carried by the story is “observed” in a 
virtual world of the represented experience.  From this “observation,” a  non-linguistic 
behavioral model can be created, based on the implicit “moral of the story,” and this 
model can form the basis for an action in its turn.  At the same time, a separate memory 
can be implanted of the story itself  – it too becomes an item for  replication; its telling is 
an action for separate imitation.  The transmission can become non -linguistic again, when  
the action produced by the model derived from the story is observed by people who 
haven’t heard the story.  Because the transmission is l anguage-based but the behavioral 
model is not, this can be called partly coded transmission.
The story can be told and retold, and its imbedded behavioral message can be 
passed on across generations, in contexts where the imbedded behavior itself is nev er 
called upon to occur.  Sometimes, the action becomes impossible or obsolete  - and yet the 
story gets attached to a context in which it is retold ritualistically for its own sake.  Many 
children’s stories, set in far off or even mythical contexts, have t his characteristic.  Nor 
must the “story” be a coherent narrative.  Advertising jingles can work as partially coded 
transmissions.  The overall point is this: there are often multiple streams of replication 
through stories  - those relating to the actions t aught by the story and those relating to the 
replication of the story itself.  Different neural pathways and mechanisms may well be 
employed in the storage and recreation of the story, on the one hand, and of the 
behavioral lessons imbedded in the story, o n the other. 
Several benefits accrue from even this level of linguistic transmission.  Since it is 
no longer necessary to be an actual observer of an action/context pairing to learn 
26 G.F. Joyce and L.E. Orgel ,   Prospects for Understanding the Origin of the RNA World , in  R.F. 
GESTELAND,  AND  J.F. A TKINS,  EDS., T HE  RNA W ORLD (1993).9
transmitted behavior, some of the subject matter bottleneck limiting un coded, non -
linguistic transmission can be avoided.   Stories can preserve infrequently needed 
information, as well as infrequently needed vocabulary.  After all, we don’t need stories 
to pass on behavior for frequently -experienced contexts.  In this light,  the somewhat 
exotic or out of date settings of many children’s stories can be seen as preserving 
behavioral information for a “rainy day.”  There is also a safety factor.  Stories about 
dangerous or unpleasant circumstances can teach survival lessons with out the hearer 
having to witness or experience problematic episodes in person.
The human appetite for stories, and the ability to remember and tell them, 
suggests that this mechanism, like language itself,
27 has had time to root itself in the 
genetic port ion of our human inheritance.  For generations, people have paid good 
money, and lots of it, to consume stories, in contexts from  People Magazine  and  The 
National Enquirer  to  Pride and Prejudice  and  The Odyssey .   One reason for the 
prevalent use of storie s may be that they require relatively little additional cognitive 
power once language is in place.  The events need to be described, “observed,” and 
modeled, but their underlying behavioral message need not be abstracted in the language 
system.  The decisi on about action can still be made through the non -linguistic pathways 
already established to direct conduct.   Describing events in words probably has a long 
history in humans, involving highly developed neural structures.   Generalizing, 
abstracting princip les and making decisions about action through the language system, 
may simply be more demanding and may work through a less fully evolved piece of 
mental equipment.  Drawing on the admittedly subjective observations of a number of 
years as a graduate law t eacher, I suggest that for most of us, stories are interesting and 
easy; word -based formulas are dull and hard.
Formulas/Fully Coded Transmission
The third mode, “fully coded” transmission through linguistic formulas, uses 
language to transmit abstracte d behavioral information.  Here the replication is of an 
explicit formula of context and action  - a recipe, recommendation, or rule. The authority 
for these formulas for action can be varied  - it might be legal, religious, parental or 
simply observational.   When it is functioning well, fully coded transmission can greatly 
increase both the type and the quantity of behavioral information passed through the 
bottleneck.   There are drawbacks, however.
 The very creation of such a formula is a task of some men tal complexity.  Good 
generalization into language may well require significantly more cognitive innovation 
than does simple linguistic description.  In light of this kind of difficulty, it is no surprise 
that human word -based analysis is so often flawed.   Even trial and error correction is at 
best imperfect.  Nor is up -front error the only source of inaccuracy.  In such highly coded 
27 STEVEN  PINKER, T HE  LANGUAGE  INSTINCT (1994).10
form, replication must be exact. Memory becomes crucial, particularly in a pre -literate 
society.  Stories can often be passed  on successfully with some latitude in their need for 
word-by - word exactness; they are informationally robust.  Formulas, however, are more 
fragile.  Their benefit is that they are much more compressed, but with such compression 
even a relatively small tra nsmission error can turn into a disaster.  In a pre -literate world, 
devices such as rhyme, rhythm, melody and labeling could help to prevent mistakes.  
Remembering and passing on the ten commandments is helped by the repetition of “thou 
shalt not” and by t he fact that you need to come up with ten of them.  “Red right 
returning,” the formula for buoy coloration in ocean navigation, relies on alliteration to 
defend its accuracy in transmission and recall.   The development of writing, of course, 
greatly stren gthened the ability to create and transmit durable recipes and rules of 
considerable length and complexity.  Our formula -challenged brains are still struggling to 
catch up with this increase in stability. 
The process by which a linguistic formula gets t ranslated into its embedded action 
–  requiring both decompression as to its sense and translation into motivation for the 
imbedded action   – is also likely to involve complicated and relatively newly -evolved 
neural pathways.  There is certainly no guarant y that this translation will occur.  One 
frequently effective step involves rehearsal, where a series of practice recreations models 
the formula -inspired action in non -linguistic, uncoded pathways as well. As with stories, 
the formula can be transmitted as  a linguistic artifact separate from any role it may 
actually have in determining action on the express “content” of the formula. 
Non-Replicating Information, Clusters and Bundles
It is important to recall that many  – perhaps even most  – linguistic mes sages are 
not replicating elements of cultural transmission.  Among the other things that language 
does is to help exchange current information on the state of the world: the weather, 
what’s for dinner tonight, where the predators are hiding right now.  On ly when the 
message has itself the property of provoking its repetition by an observer, or is linked in a 
bundle that overall has such a property, will it enter the perpetuating culture stream.  At 
the relatively raw end of this continuum, a “mind virus” l ike a chain letter can be as 
simple as a copying command and some kind of crude threat that creates a compulsion to 
obey.
28
The contents of bundles need not be drawn from a single mode. All three modes 
of replication can mix, cluster, and combine into mor e-or-less tightly bundled packages 
of differing elements.
29  Language itself, at least as learned in childhood by a native 
speaker, is largely a bundle of uncoded information, which does not use language to form 
28 Goodenough & Dawkins,  supra note 1.
29 W. Fontana, Personal communication, 1998;  L. Gabora,  supra note 1.11
its mental model.
30  Some of the other element s in the cultural mix are best viewed as 
“junk memes” intertwined with more effective elements, unexpressed in action and along 
for the ride.  Some linguistic actions may be excellent at their own replication as formulas 
or stories, but quite ineffective a t producing any behavior other than the copying of the 
story or formula itself.  There are many, many rules, laws, and commandments that are 
observed “in the breach,” rather than “to the letter,” and many, many stories that are told 
but not acted upon.  Th e old adage “do as I say, not as I do” represents a memorable and 
deeply ironic attempt in the language system to combat this tendency.  Hypocrisy may be 
as much a reflection of the strengths and weaknesses of peoples’ brain architecture as of 
the strength s and weaknesses of their character.
Indeed, the bundles themselves can carry inconsistent, even conflicting behavioral 
guides.  In genetic replication, it should be remembered, the instructions of the different 
parts of the genome can be in direct confl ict, a phenomenon sometimes linked to parental 
imprinting of  the genes in question.
31  Source differentiation may also be a factor in the 
behavioral expression of culturally transmitted information.
The coded formulas on certain subjects  – including thos e rules encoded in the law 
– may or may not be congruent with the model passed through uncoded transmission for 
behavior in the same context.
32   With this potential for discrepancy, it is almost 
inevitable that in some instances “the law is a ass, a idiot” .
33  The law is not the only 
example of cross -modal description.  Ethnography in cultural anthropology can be 
viewed as an attempt to map models from the uncoded or partly coded system of the 
culture under study into coded rules in the language of the ethno grapher.
34
External Storage
Each of the modes of cultural replication are strengthened by the development of 
30 O. R. Goodenough (1995),  supra note 1; Oliver R. Goodenough,  Retheorizing Privacy and 
Publicity 1 Intel. Prop. Q. 37 -70 (1997).
31 D. Haig,  Genetic Conflicts  in Human Pregnancy , 68  Q. R EV.  OF  BIOLOGY 495 (1993);  D. Haig 
and A.  Grafen,  Genetic Scrambling as a Defence Against Meiotic Drive , 153  J.  OF  THEORETICAL  BIOLOGY, 
531 (1991); Mochizuki, Y. Takeda, and Y. Iwasa,  The Evolution of Genomic Imprinting , 144  GENETICS, 
1283-1295 (1996).
32 Goodenough,  supra note 30.
33 CHARLES  DICKENS, O LIVER  TWIST (Originally published in London in  Bentley’s Miscellany , 
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relatively high -fidelity methods of external storage. The brain is prone to error as a 
medium of replication.  If the actions can be preserved in  decently accurate and durable 
external storage, the error rate will fall off considerably, and the breadth of  preserved 
experience increased.  External storage removes yet another aspect of the bottleneck.  Of 
course, the action of making and accessing t he external storage must be passed on at least 
partly through unstored processes.
Sculpture and pictorial representations, with a history stretching back through 
stained glass to cave paintings and beyond, provide direct, uncoded messages and can 
also pr ompt and reinforce partially and fully coded transmission.  Writing, by preserving 
language, has helped to transmit both stories and formulas. The difficulty of recreating 
infrequently practiced ritual in a pre -literate society acts as a limit on cultural  processes.
35
Literate cultures faced with a similar problem can invoke the aid of  prayer book or other 
written guide.
The effect of writing  – particularly printed writing  – on the preservation and 
transmission of recipes is striking, as anyone who has u sed a cookbook to make an exotic 
dish will recognize.  The effect of writing on rules is even more dramatic, as anyone who 
has waded through such laws as the United States Internal Revenue Code can attest.  The 
availability of writing to strengthen the two  linguistic modes has only recently been 
rivaled in the arena of direct transmission by the development of film, television, and 
other means of audiovisual preservation.  The possibilities raised by the external storage 
and dissemination of non -word-based  cultural elements are striking, and are likely to 
come at some expense to the word -based systems.  The possibility of external storage 
strengthens and complicates the process of cultural replication in all three modes, but it 
does not change its basic foun dation. 
Variation and Selection
The focus of this paper so far has been on the proximate mechanisms for 
replication in human culture.  A full description of cultural processes will also suggest 
mechanisms of variation and selection.
36  Although an exten ded treatment of the selection 
process at work on human cultural elements is beyond the scope of this discussion, the 
means of replication suggested here may be helpful in such a context.  After all, the 
ultimate selection criteria is a failure to replicat e.  In the context of the approach 
suggested here, the key to cultural transmission is provoking the imitation of action by 
35 See, e.g. ,  F.E. W ILLIAMS, D RAMA OF  OROKOLO;  THE  SOCIAL AND  CEREMONIAL  LIFE OF THE 
ELEMA (1940).
36 See, e.g. , Blackmore,  supra note 1; Dennett,  supra note 1; Dawkins,  supra note1;  A. Fog, 
Cultural r/k S election, 1  J.  M EMETICS  - E VOLUTIONARY  MODELS OF  INFORMATION  TRANSMISSION, 1 
(1997) at  http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/vol1/fog_a.html; Gabora,  supra note 1; O.R. Goodenough 
(1995),  supra note 1.13
others.  In the same way that sexual selection, so critically tied to reproduction, can 
imbed otherwise non -adaptive traits in genes , so too will psychological selection on the 
replaying of actions be critical in the passing on of cultural elements.  Success at some 
task, accuracy, truth, and such other seemingly important criteria of selection
37 can take a 
back seat to pure action -producing compulsion.
A few years ago, my elder son recently received a computer chain letter whose 
sole informative content was: 
Five people actually got killed by not sending this piece of mail.  The creator of 
this mail has a program that will track dow n everyone who sent this mail and 
whoever that didn’t send it will DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE DIE 
because this program can actually track down your address. Send this to 15 people 
within the next 15 minutes or you will die die die die, what do you  have to lose?  
Your life?
While the proposition is patently ludicrous, its replicative success appears high.  A 
number of long -lived and robust human belief systems with little demonstrable benefit to 
their adherents are propagated by only slightly more  sophisticated psychological goads.  
The saving grace is that the purported content of these systems is often ignored, while the 
coded recitation is faithfully handed on. 
Reflections on Law
So  - what can this approach tell us about law, and what can law  tell us about this 
approach?  The purpose of this essay is to put those questions on the table, rather than to 
answer them definitively  - if at all.  Nonetheless, if only by way of example, let me 
explore three specific legal topics in this light.
The Le arned Hand Test .
One of the most durable “memes” in the law is a purported test to be applied to 
decide if a particular action constitutes negligence  - the famous “Learned Hand Test.”  
This quasi -scientific formula was advanced by the wonderfully -named J udge Learned 
Hand in his opinion in the 1947 case  United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
38  Judge Hand 
proposed:
If the probablility be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability [for 
negligence] depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by  P; i.e., whether 
37 E.g., Gabora,  supra note 1.
38 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).14
B less than PL.
39
This crisp little formula has been taught to just about every law student in the generally 
required Torts class ever since.  A computer search using the Shephard’s service refers to 
899 citing references to the  Carroll To wing case as a whole
40 - a pretty good rate of 
memetic replication. Yet the formula itself is certainly useless as a call to specific action.  
The factors in the test are essentially unmeasurable.  To do Judge Hand justice, he 
himself offered it by way of a n example of a less exact idea: “Possibly it serves to bring 
this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms.”
41
The conclusion that the supposed content of a linguistically -based rule need not 
be followed to make the rule durable in memetic terms  helps us to understand the 
separation of the replicative health of this particular formula from any actual role it may 
have in determining the outcome of a case.  It’s brevity and faux -precision make it 
perfect for teaching and citation  - a kind of legal c hain letter.  It even has some usefulness 
as an explanatory tool for an underlying concept.  The fact that it will never explain a 
result through actual application is not necessary for its repetitive imitation in the law.
Separation of Law and Morals
A recurring question in jurisprudence  - and, indeed, much of philosophy  -
concerns the separation of law and morals.
42  I have previously argued that this 
distinction in all likelihood reflects different processing pathways in the human brain,
43
and prelimina ry indications suggest that neurological experimentation will support this 
approach.
44  The distinction may also reflect different transmission pathways at the 
39 Id at 173.
40 Per Shepard’s search, Oct. 8, 2001.
41 Supra note 38, at 13.
42 In the philosophical tradition, see, e.g., IMMANUEL  KANT, T HE  METAPHYSICAL  ELEMENTS OF 
JUSTICE (1763); i n jurisprudence, see, e.g.  HANS  KELSEN, I NTRODUCTION TO THE  PROBLEMS OF  LEGAL 
THEORY  (1934;  translation,1992) J OHN  AUSTIN, T HE PROVINCE OF  JURISPRUDENCE  DETERMINED (1832); 
H.L.A. H ART, T HE  CONCEPT OF  LAW (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961);  L.L. W EINREB, N ATURAL  LAW AND 
JUSTICE (1987); Margaret Gruter, An Ethological Perspective on Law and Biology, in Rodger D. Masters & 
Margaret Gruter, Eds.  THE  SENSE OF  JUSTICE: B IOLOGICAL  FOUNDATIONS OF  LAW (1992)
43  See Oliver R. Goodenough,  Law and the Architecture of Hum an Intelligence , in Haft, Fritjof et 
al. eds.,   BAUSTEINE ZU EINER  VERHALTUNGSTHEORIE DE S  RECHTS (2001); Oliver R. Goodenough, 
Mapping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and with Moral Intuition,  42  JURIMETRICS  __ 
(forthcoming, 2001).
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cultural level.  Our “moral” picture may be formed through direct observation and 
through stories , while law is explicitly formulaic, language based rules.
45  One of the 
strengths of the common law system may be a cross -fertilization between these two 
normative streams.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment and other Reasonableness Standards
The different mo des of transmission  - and the possibility of cross fertilization  -
are put to use by the law in such formulations as the United State’s Constitution’s 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,”
46 or the “reasonable person” 
standards common in the  law of Tort.  These formulas, on their face, completely lack the 
kind of objective detail that could make them self -sufficient normative declarations.  
While some argue that one must go back into history to find the details for such 
formulations in some ki nd of retrospective snap -shot,
47 I offer a counter suggestion  -
these are explicit instructions in the language -based rule stream to go and consult the 
transmissions, and mental pathways, of the other information -replicating mechanisms.  In 
this light, such  an apparently deficient rule is a compressed and coded message, which 
must be decompressed and decoded by reference to the “subjective” information of non -
linguistic and story based modeling in the reader’s head.
Conclusions
Progress in understanding t he evolution of culture, and applying it to law, will 
depend in large part on the elaboration of increasingly concrete and accurate 
understandings of the replicative mechanisms which make culture possible. Viewing 
cultural transmission as the replication o f actions, rather than of ideas, focuses us on a 
key bottleneck.  In humans, replicating actions can be broadly categorized into three 
modes: non -linguistic transmission, stories and formulas.  Decoupling the transmission of 
language based elements from th eir translation into action can help us to understand such 
human questions as hypocrisy and failures in the legal system, and suggests pathways for 
further application in the law.
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